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NOTE
RECONCILIATION AND THE FISCAL
CONSTITUTION: THE ANATOMY OF THE
1995-96 BUDGET "TRAIN WRECK"
ANITA S. KRISHNAKUMAR*
Congress originally conceived of the budget reconciliation process as
a minor fallback mechanism for bringing one year's tax and spending
policy iz line with overall budget targets. Reconciliation has since
become central to congressional efforts to reduce the federal budget
deficit. This Note argues, however, that reconciliation is limited in its
capacity to impel significant budgetary reform. The author demonstrates
how, in 1995-96, reconciliation caused repeated breakdowns in govern-
mental budget-making, undermining the entire budget process. The author
concludes that the legal, institutional, and political constraints inherent
in the reconciliation process will continue to constitute powerful obstacles
to congressional efforts to implement sweeping national reform via the
annual budget.
For months Washington had been obsessed with the notion
of a train wreck coming down the line: Gingrich and his
budget-cutting revolutionaries steaming in from one direc-
tion, Clinton and his veto rolling in from the other. Perhaps
the fact that it was so visible for so long made few people
believe that it would actually happen in the end. Certainly
one side would stop, or both would move off to a track of
compromise. But the train wreck did happen. Many times, in
fact. A series of train wrecks began that day in mid-Novem-
ber and continued into the first two weeks of 1996.1
In 1995, Congress tried to use the budget reconciliation proc-
ess to enact an ambitious fiscal agenda that would restructure
the federal government, implement a mammoth tax cut, and
balance the budget in seven years. Its efforts led to two historic
federal government shutdowns, thirteen stopgap spending meas-
ures, several presidential vetoes, and ultimately failed to produce
a meaningful fiscal agreement with the White House.2
*Law clerk designate to the Honorable Jos6 A. Cabranes, Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. A.B., Stanford University, 1996; member, Class of 1999, Yale Law School. I
would like to thank Professor Kate Stith for her encouragement, valuable comments,
and suggestions.
I DAVID MARANISS & MICHAEL WEISSKOPF, "TELL NEWT TO SHUT UP!" 149 (1996).
2See James A. Thurber, Centralization, Devolution, and Turf Protection in the
Congressional Budget Process, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 325, 325 (Lawrence C.
Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1997).
Harvard Journal on Legislation
This extraordinary breakdown in budget-making, while un-
precedented in scope and degree, was not the first, nor is it likely
to be the last "train wreck" of its kind. In accounting for the
breakdown, legal and political commentators have focused on
specific political differences over issues such as health entitle-
ments 3 and the pride and ambition of individuals such as Repre-
sentative Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.). 4 The repeated incidence of
smaller-scale budget breakdowns over the past decade and a
half,5 however, suggests a more fundamental and enduring struc-
tural explanation for such episodes: Congress's failure to work
within the limitations of the budget "reconciliation" process.
Reconciliation is a procedure that allows Congress to alter tax
and entitlement laws in order to raise or reduce both revenues
and federal spending. Conceived in 1974 as a minor fallback
mechanism for bringing one year's tax and spending policy in
line with overall budget targets, reconciliation has since evolved
into Congress's most powerful deficit-reduction tool, and has be-
come an integral part of the government's implicit "fiscal con-
stitution." 6 In recent years particularly, reconciliation has be-
come the centerpiece of the congressional budget process, as
both Congress and the President have made it the cornerstone
for comprehensive fiscal packages aimed at reining in the deficit.
Yet reconciliation still bears the procedural marks of its mod-
est origins, and is limited in its capacity to impel sweeping
budgetary reform. First, reconciliation is an optional budgetary
measure that provides Congress with almost no procedural lev-
erage to force the President to accept or cooperate in its reforms.
Second, reconciliation's late timing in the budget process, and
restrictive rules governing the amendment of and debate on rec-
onciliation legislation, make it an inapt vehicle for setting the
year's fiscal agenda. Third, and related to the second, reconcili-
3 See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, Budgetized Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution
in Congress's 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411 (1996).
4 See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, SHOWDOWN: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GINGRICH
CONGRESS AND THE CLINTON WHITE HOUSE (1996).
5 Budget breakdowns between Congress and the President had engendered federal
government shutdowns nine times before 1995, although none had lasted longer than
three days. See George Hager, Budget Battle Came Sooner Than Either Side Expected,
53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3503, 3503 (1995).6 The fiscal constitution is the legal framework that governs the federal budget
process. It includes the constitutional provisions, statutes, and informal procedures
followed by Congress in conducting federal spending, borrowing, and taxation. For a
more detailed description of how the fiscal constitution operates, see Kate Stith,
Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
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ation does not involve annual appropriations for federal depart-
ments (which are handled by the appropriations subcommittees);
thus, when Congress attempts reconciliation, its work on annual
appropriations often becomes derailed and remains unfinished at
the October 1st start of the fiscal year. Congress must then pass
one or more stopgap spending measures known as "continuing
resolutions" ("CRs") in order to avoid a government shutdown
while it continues to work on the budget. Finally, in situations
of divided government, the partisan politics required to pass
reconciliation legislation often conflicts with the compromises
necessary to prevent a presidential veto. All of these limitations
have played a significant role in engendering recent budget break-
downs, particularly that of 1995-96.
In order to appreciate the effect of the institutional limitations
of the reconciliation process, it is necessary to understand the
legal and political norms that govern the budget process gener-
ally, and reconciliation in particular. Part I of this Note analyzes
reconciliation's place in the fiscal constitution, exploring how
the process has evolved in the twenty-some years since its con-
ception in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 ("Budget Act").7
Part II examines the 1995-96 budget battle, illustrating how
Congress's attempt to use the reconciliation process as a tool for
comprehensive governmental reform engendered that year's break-
down in budget-making. Part Ill assesses the legal and institu-
tional limitations inherent in the budget reconciliation process,
drawing lessons from 1995 and other recent budget battles be-
tween Congress and the President.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF RECONCILIATION IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
A. Reconciliation at First Blush
Neither the federal Constitution nor our implicit "fiscal con-
stitution" requires that federal spending be balanced against fed-
eral revenues.8 In fact, prior to the passage of the Budget Act,
7 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1,
2, & 31 U.S.C.).
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (requiring only legislative approval, not adequate
revenue, before money may be drawn from the Federal Treasury); see also Kate Stith,
Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Granm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L.
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Congress traditionally considered tax and spending legislation as
separate measures, 9 and had no mechanism for combining all
federal spending proposals into one comprehensive budget.'0
Moreover, social insurance and other "backdoor" entitlement
spending lay entirely outside the budget process." Thus, con-
gressional budget policy was essentially the "accidental" aggre-
gate of independent spending and revenue decisions made by
different committees at different times. The Budget Act changed
this by establishing budget committees and requiring Congress
to pass a budget resolution setting forth congressional priorities
and aggregate annual targets for new budget authority (appro-
priations), outlays (actual spending), revenues, the deficit, and
the total public debt.' 2 These targets were to be revised and
enacted as "binding ceilings" in a second budget resolution
two weeks before the start of the fiscal year.l" Further, the Act
created a reconciliation process through which Congress could
direct changes in existing tax and entitlement legislation to
bring the overall budget in line with the second resolution's
targets. 14
The Budget Act conceived of reconciliation as a wrap-up pro-
cedure to be conducted at the tail end of the budget process. If
the second budget resolution called for an increase or decrease
in either tax revenues or spending levels for statutory entitle-
ments, the Act authorized Congress to write into the resolution
"reconciliation instructions" directing the relevant committee(s)15
to draft legislation to produce revenue and entitlement spending
REV. 593, 600 (1988) (noting that the Constitution does not limit annual federal
spending to available tax revenues).
9See V. BROWNE, THE CONTROL OF THE PUBLIC BUDGET 11-17 (1949), cited in
Stith, supra note 8, at 601 n.43; L. LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA
269-339 (1930), cited in Stith, supra note 8, at 601 n.43.
l°But see Stith, supra note 8, at 600 n.42 (noting that the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946 called for Congress to adopt an annual "legislative budget," but the call
was ignored and the legislation repealed in 1970).
11 See Alice M. Rivlin, The Need for a Better Budget Process, 4 BROOKINGs REV. 3,
5 (1986).
12See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 301, 88 Stat. at 306-08 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 632 (Supp. II 1996)); STITH, supra note 8, at 617.
13See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(a) & (b), 88 Stat. at 315 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 641(a) (1994)). The provision in the Budget Act requiring action
by September 15 was repealed in 1985 with one requiring action by June 15. In 1990,
this provision was deleted altogether by Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13210(2).
14See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(c), 88 Stat. at 315 (codified as
amended in scattered portions of 2 U.S.C. § 641 (1994)).
15 For example, reconciliation instructions concerning tax laws go to the House Ways
and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, while instructions to reduce
farm subsidy entitlements are sent to the Agriculture Committees.
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in line with the resolution's ceilings.16 Should these reconcili-
ation instructions pertain to only one committee, that committee
would then report its reconciliation legislation directly to the
House or Senate floor for a vote.17 Should the budget resolution
direct more than one committee to write reconciliation legisla-
tion, however, the committees would report their recommenda-
tions to the budget committees, which would then combine the
various committee reports into a single, omnibus reconciliation
bill18 without any substantive revision. 19 The packaged reconcili-
ation bill would subsequently be reported to the floor of each
chamber to be debated, possibly amended, and voted upon.20 Any
section of the bill failing to meet the responsible committee's
deficit target would be subject to a floor amendment altering it
to meet such targets or to a motion to recommit, requiring the
committee to report back a new proposal that does meet the
target.
The Budget Act also established special rules to expedite the
consideration of reconciliation bills on the Senate floor.2' In par-
ticular, it placed strict restrictions on the consideration of non-
germane amendments22 and limited debate on reconciliation bills
to twenty hours, insulating them from filibusters. 23
16 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(a), 88 Stat. at 315 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 641(a) (1994)).
17See id. § 310(c)(1), 88 Stat. at 315 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 641(b)(1)
(1994)).
18See id. § 310(c)(2), 88 Stat. at 315 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 641(b)(2)
(1994)).
19While the Budget Act gives committees wide latitude in deciding how to reach
their target levels, if they do not comply with these levels, Congress can amend their
legislation on the floor to achieve the levels set out in the budget resolution. See
CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RE-
SEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 890 (1989). This procedure was codified by the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act § 310(d)(5), 2 U.S.C. § 641(d)(5)
(1994) (permitting the House Rules Committee to authorize such amendments).
20 See JOHN B. GILMOUR, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? 97 (1990).
21 With regard to both the House and the Senate, the Budget Act has been amended
to sanction explicitly points of order against any amendment that would have the effect
of increasing total outlays or decreasing total revenues, see 2 U.S.C. § 641(d)(1) & (2)
(1994), and to bar reconciliation bills from altering Social Security in any manner. See
2 U.S.C. § 641(g) (1994).22See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 §§ 305(b)(2), 310(e)(1), 88 Stat. at 311,
316 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(2), 641(e)(1) (1994)).23 See id. § 310(e)(2), 88 Stat. at 316 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 641 (e)(2)
(1994)).
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1. Initial Implementation: Assumed Legislative Savings
From 1976 to 1979, the newly created budget committees
attempted a voluntary form of reconciliation called "assumed
legislative savings."2 4 Essentially, the budget committees wrote
the first budget resolution based on the assumption that the
relevant committees would report legislation reducing spending
on their entitlements. 25 These assumptions were in no way bind-
ing or enforceable; if the committees failed to produce the nec-
essary savings, spending would exceed the targets set forth in
the resolution.2 6 Committees, however, consistently ignored the
budget resolution's assumptions, and efforts to reduce federal
spending via legislative savings were largely unsuccessful. 27
2. Reinventing Reconciliation
The failure to achieve legislative savings combined with na-
tional economic decline spurred experimentation with the recon-
ciliation process. 2 In 1980, in an effort to balance the budget
and stem inflation,29 the House Budget Committee, for the first
time, included mandatory reconciliation instructions in its budget
resolution. 0 This inaugural use of reconciliation set two impor-
tant precedents. First, it initiated the use of reconciliation in the
first budget resolution rather than the second, as envisioned by
the Budget Act." The Budget Committee defended its authority
to amend the process in this manner by citing a provision in the
Budget Act that states that the first budget resolution may require
any procedure "which is considered appropriate to carry out the
purpose of this Act."32 Including reconciliation in the first reso-
lution was necessary, the Budget Committee argued, to give the
24See COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., A REVIEW OF THE
RECONCILIATION PROCESS 8 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter Reconciliation Review];
GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 105.
2 See GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 105.26 See id.
27 See Reconciliation Review, supra note 24, at 9.
28 See id. at 16.29See GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 108-09.30 Specifically, the resolution contained instructions to eight House and eight Senate
authorizing committees to report legislation saving $9.059 billion in outlays in fiscal
year 1981. See Reconciliation Review, supra note 24, at 16.
3' See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 310, 88 Stat. 297,
315-16 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 641 (1994)).32Reconciliation Review, supra note 24, at 17 (citing the Budget Committee Report
explaining the source of its authority).
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authorizing committees enough time to consider and propose the
required savings legislation. 3
Second, the 1980 reconciliation effort ushered in an era of
top-down party leadership control over the budget process.34 Be-
fore 1980, the budget committees negotiated and wrote the budget
resolutions. In 1980, however, the budget committees performed
an essentially ministerial function, drafting the resolution from
an agreement negotiated by the Democratic party leadership and
the White House.35 Since then, party leaders have continued to
mastermind the budget resolution, as well as control and engi-
neer the passage of reconciliation legislation through Congress. 6
In 1981, the newly elected Reagan administration redefined
reconciliation once again by using the process to implement a
sweeping reorientation of the federal budget.37 Republican party
leaders formulated a reconciliation bill that included the central
elements of President Reagan's economic agenda: large tax cuts,
increased defense spending, and reduced domestic spending.38
Congress approved the bill essentially along party lines, with the
33 Representative Leon Panetta (D-Cal.), then HBC chairman, explained the need for
reconciliation in the first budget resolution as follows:
The Committee took the approach of including reconciliation in the first
resolution because it believes that this method is fairer to the committees and
fairer to the budget process than using reconciliation in the second resolution.
With this approach, committees can be given more than the 10 days provided
in the Budget Act for second resolution reconciliation to act on proposals. The
reported resolution sets June 15 as the deadline for action, giving committees
substantial leadtime to have hearings, consider alternatives, and report legis-
lation. In addition, it insures that the changes in mandatory spending law are
made sufficiently before the start of the fiscal year so that agencies can issue
regulations or make other programmatic changes to be sure the savings begin
on October 1. Under the second resolution approach, legislation may be
enacted days or a few weeks before the start of the fiscal year, thus undercut-
ting potential savings. Finally, too, the first resolution approach allows the
Budget Committee time to fully evaluate the legislative actions that have been
taken and incorporate this information into their second resolution marks.
Under the second resolution method, the Committees on the Budget have no
idea at the time of markup whether or how reconciliation will finally be
implemented and what precise savings figures will be, leading almost certainly
to a third resolution to adjust estimates after action is completed. The
approach the committee took this year is a far more responsible one.
Reconciliation Review, supra note 24, at 17.
34 See GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 109.
35 See id. Although the final reconciliation bill failed actually to balance the budget,
it did achieve $8.2 billion in deficit reduction savings. See A History of Reconciliation,
53 CONG. Q. WK.Y. REP. 2714, 2714 (1995) [hereinafter History].36 See infra Part II.B.
37 See Howard Baker, Jr., An Introduction to the Politics of Reconciliation, 20 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (1983).
38See James A. Miller & James D. Range, Reconciling an Irreconcilable Budget:
The New Politics of the Budget Process, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 10, 11 (1983).
Harvard Journal on Legislation
support of conservative Southern Democrats in the House. 39 Rec-
onciliation was the favored vehicle for Reagan's economic pro-
gram because it allowed substantial spending reductions to be
"packaged" into one bill, enabling party leaders to claim that all
government programs would bear equally the brunt of budgetary
sacrifices. More importantly, a single omnibus reconciliation bill
facing a single vote in Congress was more likely to pass because
dissatisfied congressmen would be unlikely to kill an entire budget
agenda over a few disagreeable provisions.40 Finally, unlike any
other revenue or appropriation measure, reconciliation could origi-
nate in the then Republican Senate.41
The 1981 reconciliation process also involved two significant
procedural innovations: multi-year reconciliation and instructions
requiring alterations in authorization legislation.4 2 Congress in-
stituted multi-year reconciliation to prevent committees from
fiddling with the books to achieve spending reductions 43 and to
facilitate its own efforts at long-term deficit reduction. This in-
novation has since become a permanent part of the budget rec-
onciliation process. 44 Congress implemented reconciliation in-
structions requiring changes in authorization legislation because
they were essential to the success of Reagan's economic program
(which relied almost exclusively on spending cuts to achieve
deficit reduction).45 Such instructions, however, have since been
disfavored for usurping too much power from the authorization
committees. 46
39Professor Charles Tiefer notes that although the House of Representatives had a
nominal Democratic majority in 1981, on budget matters, the Republicans had a
functional majority due to the support of Southern Democrats. See Tiefer supra note
3, at 430 n.67.40See Miller & Range, supra note 38, at 12.
41 See id. at 13. Article I, section 7, clause 1 of the Constitution mandates that all
bills proposing to "raise revenues" must originate in the House. Based on this Taxation
Clause, Congress has established a tradition that appropriation bills must originate in
the House as well. See TIEFER, supra note 19, at 924. Reagan's reconciliation bill
circumvented this constitutional provision because it sought to reduce revenues.
421n contrast to appropriations, entitlements, and other forms of direct spending,
authorizations do not provide an agency with funds. Rather, authorization laws create
programs and sanction future appropriations for specified purposes. See Miller &
Range, supra note 38, at 16-18.
43 Prior to the introduction of multi-year reconciliation, committees often "achieved"
savings by shifting government payments due in September to October; this did not
reduce total spending but gave the appearance of reducing spending in a given fiscal
year. See GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 111 n.23.
44See id.
45See Miller & Range, supra note 38, at 18.46 See GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 96 n.3.
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B. Amending Reconciliation
1. The Byrd Rule
The special rules governing reconciliation made the process
an attractive tool for pursuing deficit reduction. However, these
same rules also invited committees to attach extraneous, non-
budgetary proposals to reconciliation legislation in order to in-
sulate them from ordinary debate, filibuster, and amendment.47
After several struggles between committees and other senators
seeking to strip such extraneous proposals from reconciliation
bills,48 the Senate in 1985 adopted a budget procedure known as
the "Byrd Rule. '49
The Byrd Rule enables any senator to raise a point of order
against provisions or amendments to the reconciliation bill or its
conference report that are "extraneous to the instructions to a
committee." 50 A provision or amendment is considered extrane-
ous if it: does not produce a change in outlays or revenues,
increases outlays or cuts revenues and the relevant committee
fails to meet its target level, is outside the jurisdiction of the
committee responsible for that section of the bill, produces changes
in outlays or revenues that are "merely incidental" to the provi-
sion, leads to a net increase in outlays or decrease in revenues
beyond the years covered by the bill, or changes Social Secu-
rity.51 When a senator raises a point of order against a provision,
the presiding officer of the Senate decides whether it is extrane-
ous under the Byrd Rule. Once he sanctions a Byrd Rule point
of order, the provision must be stricken from the bill unless a
three-fifths Senate supermajority votes to waive the Rule.52 Al-
though the Byrd Rule formally applies only to the Senate, in
practice it governs the House as well because the two chambers
47 See, e.g., TiEFER, supra note 19, at 891 n.117 (noting Senator Byrd's complaint
about the Senate Commerce Committee's inclusion of seven extraneous provisions and
the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee's attachment of several more).
4S1or a more detailed account of these battles, see TIEFER, supra note 19, at 891-
93.
49 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,
§ 20001, 100 Stat. 390, 390-91 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.A. § 644 (West
1998)). For a discussion of the specific considerations that motivated the Byrd Rule,
see The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Inclusion of Unrelated Matters: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Legislative Process of the House Comm. on Rules, 99th
Cong. 40-47 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings].
502 U.S.C. § 644(a) (1994).
51 See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A) (1994).52 See TIEFER, supra note 19, at 908.
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must approve identical conference reports for the reconciliation
bill to pass.
The Byrd Rule was a significant innovation in the evolution
of the budget process. It not only elevated the importance of the
budget resolution, but also instituted a formal emphasis on deficit
reduction (or at least curbing deficit growth) as the ultimate goal
of reconciliation.
2. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
In the years immediately following 1981, additional attempts
to accomplish deficit reduction through reconciliation met with
only limited success. Despite numerous negotiations, Congress
and the President could not agree on specific tax or spending
policies that would significantly reduce deficit growth.53 By 1985,
the nation faced a federal "budget crisis,''54 to which Congress
responded by passing the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Re-
duction Act ("GRII")5 GRH prescribed predetermined deficit maxi-
mums for the next five years. If Congress and the President failed
to produce the deficit reductions necessary to comply with these
maximums, GRH relied on a procedure called "sequestration" to
impose across-the-board federal spending cuts that forced such
reductions.5 6 Congress enacted GRH with the belief that seques-
tration would never occur; the logic behind GRH was to use the
threat of sequestration to scare both Congress and the President
into working together to pass a deficit-reducing budget.57 GRH
53 Although Republican Senate leaders persuaded the Reagan administration to support
reconciliation bills in 1982 and 1984, both bills involved key compromises and failed
to produce enough savings to control the deficit. See History, supra note 35, at 2714.
In 1983, attempts to produce a reconciliation bill stalled due to a congressional-presi-
dential impasse over increasing taxes. See id.54 Stith, supra note 8, at 595-96 (noting that members of Congress, scholars, and
political observers widely recognized a budget crisis).
55 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
99 Stat. 1037 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter GRH]. GRH was enacted as an amendment to a bill providing urgent
supplemental appropriations and a critical increase in the statutory limit on the public
debt.
56For a more thorough explanation of how GRH operated, see Stith, supra note 8,
at 633-52. Notably, the original act empowered the Comptroller General of the United
States to activate the cuts if and when sequestation became necessary. In 1986,
however, the Supreme Court held that Congress's assignment of this function to the
Comptroller General violated the separation of powers doctrine. See Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986). Congress subsequently amended GRH to remove this unconsti-
tutional delegation of power, but the rest of the Act survived in its original form.57 See id. at 624.
598 [Vol. 35
1998] Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution
thus sought, in essence, to compel reconciliation-for the only
practical way to achieve the deficit maximums set by GRH
without across-the-board domestic spending cuts was to increase
revenues or reduce entitlement spending.
GRH also accelerated the budget schedule within which rec-
onciliation takes place 8 and set a precedent for employing five-
year, rather than three-year, deficit projections. Indeed, although
GRH itself was not part of a reconciliation bill, the five-year
timetable it inaugurated has become the standard for subsequent
reconciliation legislation.
C. Recent Innovations
GRH did force Congress and the President to pass some kind
of reconciliation bill in subsequent years, though not in the
manner Congress had envisioned. In 1987, for instance, a Demo-
cratic Congress and Republican President deadlocked over taxes
and nearly accepted sequestration cuts rather than produce a
reconciliation bill.5 9 It was only the historic stock market crash
in October, which many attributed to Wall Street malaise about
impending GRH cuts, that impelled both sides to convene an
economic summit and ultimately pass a two-year reconciliation
bill.60 A similar impasse over President Bush's proposed capital
gains tax cut stalled attempts at reconciliation in 1989, trigger-
ing across-the-board GRH cuts. Rather than accept these cuts
permanently, Congress and the President eventually enacted a
reconciliation bill in late November.61
A bitter budget battle in 1990 culminated in an omnibus rec-
onciliation bill that amended the budget process one more time,
through the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 ("BEA"). 62 The
BEA built on GRH's five-year deficit maximums by instituting
a five-year budget process, discretionary spending caps, and pay-
as-you-go ("PAYGO") rules for taxes and entitlements. 63 The
58See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 § 201(b), 99
Stat. at 1040 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 631 (1994)).59 See History, supra note 35, at 2715.
60 See id.
61 The reconciliation bill did, however, retain $4 billion of GRH cuts as part of the
bill. See id.62 Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 13101-13501, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-1573 to 1388-1630
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 & 13 U.S.C).
63 For a more detailed analysis of the innovative mechanisms introduced by the BEA,
see James A. Thurber, Congressional-Presidential Battles to Balance the Budget, in
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PAYGO rules require Congress to offset fully any legislation that
increases statutory entitlement spending or decreases revenues with
legislation that cuts other statutory entitlements or raises reve-
nues elsewhere.6 4 Although PAYGO does not mandate reconcili-
ation, it changes the way reconciliation operates because Con-
gress must now pay for any provisions that reduce revenues or
increase entitlements with other provisions that either increase
taxes or reduce entitlements. This feature makes it politically
difficult both to cut taxes and to increase entitlement spending.
Thus, under PAYGO, Congress is unlikely to be able to pass
economic packages like Reagan's 1981 plan, which simultane-
ously instituted large tax cuts and reduced appropriations spend-
ing; for such tax cuts would have to be paid for either with other
tax increases or with reductions in entitlement spending. In 1993,
Congress and the Clinton administration extended the discretion-
ary spending caps and PAYGO rules set forth in the BEA through
1998, via the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
("OBRA"). 61
II. RECONCILIATION AND CONGRESSIONAL AMBITION IN
1995-96
A. The Congressional Agenda
Congressional Republicans in 1995 sought to use the budget
process, and reconciliation in particular, to enact sweeping gov-
erumental reform on the scale of a presidential national agenda.
Their $894 billion reconciliation bill dwarfed President Reagan's
$130.6 billion 1981 budget package, and more than doubled Presi-
dent Clinton's $433 billion budget reforms in 1993.66 The Re-
publican bill simultaneously attempted two monumental initia-
tives: the institution of an elaborate fiscal blueprint to balance
the budget in seven years, and a massive restructuring of the size
and scope of the federal government within one year.
RIVALS FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS 191, 196-99 (James A.
Thurber ed., 1996).
64 See id. at 197; see also Dennis S. Ippolito, The Budget Process and Budget Policy:
Resolving the Mismatch, in CURRENT ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 297, 301
(Frederick S. Lane ed., 1987).
65 Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 14001-14004, 107 Stat. 312, 683-85 (codified as amended
in 2 U.S.C. §§ 665, 900-902, 904).66 See Reconciliation Now a Major Tool, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3286, 3286 (1995).
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1. Fiscal Reform
The 104th Congress's fiscal agenda was more ambitious in its
deficit reduction goals than any attempted by preceding Con-
gresses or Presidents. The agenda was driven by three main
priorities set forth in the House's "Contract With America" plat-
form: cutting taxes, cutting spending without touching defense
or Social Security, and balancing the budget by 2002. The deci-
sion not to cut defense (16% of federal spending) or Social
Security (22%), combined with the inability to cut interest pay-
ments on the federal debt (16%), took more than half of all
federal spending off the table. 67 Congress thus sought to cut
extensively from the other half: non-defense programs and statu-
tory entitlements. 6S
Congress planned to produce the non-defense spending reduc-
tions by lowering and extending the five-year discretionary spend-
ing caps set by the BEA and amended by OBRA, creating new
seven-year caps for fiscal 1996 through fiscal 2002.69 The bulk
of the savings were to come from the reconciliation bill, which
proposed unprecedentedly deep cuts in health insurance and wel-
fare entitlements.70  The reconciliation bill also proposed
$245 billion in tax cuts, primarily corporate and capital gains. 71
This combination of cuts in entitlements and taxes prompted
congressional Democrats to charge, in PAYGO terms, that Re-
publicans were cutting Medicare to pay for tax savings for the
wealthy.72
The 104th Congress further sought to entrench its priorities in
the long-term fiscal blueprint through two structural amend-
ments to the fiscal constitution: the line-item veto and a three-
fifths tax rule in the House. The line-item veto enables the
President to strike from the budget individual appropriations,
67 See No Winners in Budget Showdown, 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-44, 2-44 (1995)
[hereinafter No Winners].
68 See id.
69See GOP Throws Down Budget Gauntlet, 51 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-20, 2-22 (1995)
[hereinafter Budget Gauntlet). These spending cuts were projected to save $213 billion
over the next seven years. See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-47.70The bill proposed to cut Medicare spending by $270 billion, Medicaid spending
by $163.4 billion, and welfare spending by $81.5 billion. See No Winners, supra note
67, at 2-58.
71 See id. at 2-44.
7 Republicans responded by amending PAYGO rules to prohibit such an explicit
tradeoff; however, the amendment did not prevent them from cutting Medicare and
taxes at the same time, and thus was largely ineffectual. See id. at 2-47.
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new entitlements, and entitlement expansion provisions? 3 Al-
though it does not empower the President to veto automatic
increases in entitlement spending caused by inflation or demo-
graphic changes, the line-item veto illustrated where Congress
intended future deficit reduction to come from. 74 The second
structural amendment, the three-fifths tax rule, erects a proce-
dural barrier against tax increases by requiring more than a
simple majority to initiate revenue-raising proposals. 75 In simulta-
neously enacting these two reforms the 104th Congress sought to
impose legal and institutional constraints on future legislators to
balance the budget on its terms-via deep cuts in discretionary
spending and entitlements absent offsetting tax increases.
2. The New Federal Government
Congressional Republicans in 1995 sought to restructure the
federal government in two ways. First, they would shift control
over several aspects of federal spending to the states. Second,
they would abolish or "zero-out" several components of the
federal bureaucracy.76 Congress's goal, in essence, was to cre-
ate a smaller, less expensive, and less powerful federal govern-
ment.77
The drive to transfer control over spending to the states was
related to the resolve to cut entitlements. Congress planned to
use reconciliation legislation to convert many federal statutory
entitlements into block grants operated by the states, who would
in turn be free to design their own benefit packages and formulas
for determining who was eligible for aid. Further, Congress sought
to end the designation of such programs as "entitlements," elimi-
nating the long-standing guarantee of minimum government as-
73See Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, §§ 2-3, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996)(codified as amended in 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692); see also Tiefer, supra note 3, at 442.74Several members of Congress attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the
line-item veto, but were ultimately turned away by the Supreme Court for lack of
Article M standing, since the President had not yet utilized the veto. See Raines v.
Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).75 The three-fifths tax provision generated a great deal of criticism from constitutional
scholars, see Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Newt Gingrich,
104 YALE L.J. 1539 (1995), and House Democrats, who argued that it violates the
Constitution. The latter filed a lawsuit challenging the provision but lost, as with the
line-item veto, on the ground that they lacked standing. See Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d
831 (D.C. Cir. 1997).76 See H.R. Con. Res. 67, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Budget Gauntlet, supra note
69, at 2-20, 2-23.
77See Budget Gauntlet, supra note 69, at 2-20.
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sistance for the nation's poor and needy.78 Congress's plan to use
the budget process in this manner was unprecedented; although
there had been other conservative proposals seeking to decrease
entitlement spending, none attempted to use the budget recon-
ciliation process to undo entirely the concept of entitlements. 79
Congress planned to reduce the size of the federal government
by eliminating the federal Departments of Commerce, Educa-
tion, and Energy, which the majority regarded as unnecessary.80
In addition, Congress proposed to abolish several sub-depart-
mental federal agencies, such as the National Endowment for the
Arts, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the National
Endowment for the Humanities.8' Finally, the majority sought to
terminate more than 170 federal programs including the Presi-
dent's National Service Initiative, Goals 2000, Head Start, and
family planning counseling.82 Republican leaders' crusade to do
away with numerous governmental agencies and programs would
prove extremely exacting and time-consuming, as Democrats
and Republicans alike fought to preserve programs important to
their constituencies. 83
B. Implementation: The 1995-96 Budget Battle
The 1995-96 budget battle was precipitated both by the sub-
stantive breadth of Congress's agenda and by the majority's
refusal to compromise on its fiscal tenets. From the outset, the
congressional majority demonstrated an unwillingness to com-
promise on the terms of its balanced-budget agenda. Rather than
attempt a budget summit with the President, as prior Congresses
in divided governments had done, the 104th Congress planned
to assemble a reconciliation bill which ignored the President's
priorities, and then use strategic budgetary maneuvers to force
him to sign the bill.
78 See H.R. Con. Res. 67, 104th Cong. (1995); see also No Winners, supra note 67,
at 2-44.79 See Tiefer, supra note 3, at 445 (noting Reagan's proposals for changing Medicaid
in 1981 and congressional Republicans' call for Medicaid reform at the start of the
1985 budget process, but explaining that in both years the budget process itself was
used to "ameliorat[e] ideological thrusts" rather than to enact them).
S°See Budget Gauntlet, supra note 69, at 2-20, 2-23.
81 See H.R. Con. Res. 67, 104th Cong. (1995); see also DREW, supra note 4, at 263.
82 See DREW, supra note 4, at 269.
83 See id. at 264.
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To this end, Republican leaders crafted the budget resolution
behind closed doors with the Republican Governor's Associa-
tion,84 eschewing input from congressional Democrats and the
White House. Moreover, it contained a subtle procedural maneu-
ver designed to enhance Congress's leverage vis- -vis the Presi-
dent. The maneuver concerned the statutory limit on the public
debt; because the federal government was scheduled to reach the
limit of its borrowing authority by the end of November, it
would require an extension of the statutory debt limit to continue
operating without defaulting on its loan obligations.15 A House
procedure known as the "Gephardt Rule" traditionally operated
to facilitate the passage of debt limit bills by deeming them
automatically authorized as soon as the chamber adopted the
final version of the budget resolution.86 However, the fiscal 1996
budget resolution waived the Gephardt Rule, enabling the House
to hold the debt limit extension in reserve until the President
accepted a reconciliation bill on its terms. 87
In keeping with Congress's "Contract With America" agenda,
the budget resolution contained reconciliation instructions di-
recting twelve House and eleven Senate committees to produce
$894 billion in deficit reduction and $245 billion in tax cuts.88
The sheer number and magnitude of these cuts guaranteed long
and extensive debate in drafting reconciliation legislation, thus
slowing down the entire budget process. The committees in charge
of cutting health care entitlements, for instance, did not finish
drafting their reconciliation legislation until several weeks into
the new fiscal year.8 9 Committee rebellion against cuts in farm
84 See Tiefer, supra note 3, at 431; see also Colette Fraley, Republicans are Standing
Firm on Giving Medicaid to States, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2901, 2901 (1995).85See Debt Limit 'Weapon' Lacks Force, 51 CoNG.Q. ALMANAC 2-63, 2-63 (1995)
[hereinafter Debt Limit]. The debt limit at the time was $4.9 trillion; the last time that
it had been increased was in 1993, as part of Clinton's budget-reconciliation bill. See
id.86Under the Gephardt Rule, the bills then went automatically to the Senate for
consideration, effectively putting control over debt limit increases in the Senate's
hands. See id. at 2-64.
87 House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) told Clinton in a meeting at the White
House that "he and his fellow Republicans were prepared to use the continuing
resolution and debt limit to get their way." DREW, supra note 4, at 336. The Speaker
also made his party's strategy clear in remarks delivered to the Public Securities
Association, stating that: "I don't care what the price is. I don't care if we have no
executive offices, no bonds for 60 days .... What we are saying to Clinton is: Do not
assume that we will flinch, because we won't." Newt Gingrich, quoted in Debt Limit,
supra note 85, at 2-64.88 See H.R. Con. Res. 67, 104th Cong. (1995).9The House Ways and Means Committee took its Medicare proposal to the House
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subsidies and federal employee pensions similarly delayed, and
even jeopardized, reconciliation. 0 The House Budget Committee
ultimately restored the farm subsidy reductions dropped by the
Agriculture Committee, but only after several rounds of negotia-
tions and ann-twisting between party leaders and committee mem-
bers.91 When the bill finally passed the House, it contained nu-
merous ideological provisions indicative of Republicans' broad
national agenda but no concessions to House Democrats or to
the President.92
Senate action on the bill highlighted the magnitude of the
reforms the reconciliation bill sought to achieve. First, Senate
moderates pushed to pare back some of the most drastic cuts
instituted by the House.93 An amendment by Senator John Chafee
(R-R.I.), for example, expanded aid to disabled persons, preg-
nant women, and children. 94 Second, the Senate used the Byrd
Rule to strike out forty-six ideological provisions passed by the
House, 95 the most significant of which were related to welfare
and health entitlements. 96 Finally, senators offered more than
seventy-nine amendments to the reconciliation bill in only two
days of floor debate, setting a chamber record. 97 Several senators
decried the inadequacies of a process that provided so little time
to consider legislation with such potentially deep and enduring
consequences. An exchange on the Senate floor between Senator
Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.), author of the procedural rules in the
original Budget Act, and Senator Pete Domenici (R-N.M.), is
instructive:
MR. BYRD: This [budget-reconciliation] is a historic bill
.... But we are down to the point now where we have only
30 seconds to the side for debate on an amendment ....
floor on October 19, 1995, and the Senate Finance Committee did not report its version
until close to October 23. See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-47, 2-50.90 See id. at 2-44, 2-46; see also David Hosanky, Panel Rejects Farm Overhaul in a
Rebuke to Leadership, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2875 (1995).
91 See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-48.
92 See id. at 2-44, 2-49.
93 Specifically, Senate moderates ameliorated cuts made in the following areas:
student loans, health programs, nursing homes, and programs for the disabled. See id.
at 2-51.94 See Tiefer, supra note 3, at 437; No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-51.95 See No Winners, supra note 68, at 2-57.
96For example, the Byrd Rule was used to eliminate a provision that placed a
five-year limit on the number of years that a family could receive welfare assistance,
as well as a provision prohibiting Medicare reimbursements for assisted suicide. See
id.97 See id. at 2-51, 2-57.
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[W]e have gone from 103 days on a massive bill to 20 hours
.... I am concerned with what we are doing to the Senate,
what we are doing to the legislative process. We are inhibited
from calling up amendments. We have had a very insufficient
time for debate on this massive, comprehensive bill, a bill
that may be even more far-reaching, in some respects, than
was the civil rights bill of 1964 ... I do not think it is in
the best interests of the institution. I do not think it is in the
best interests of the American people, because we Senators
do not know-to a very considerable degree-what we are
voting for. There is not a Senator in this body-not one-
who knows everything that is in this bill. Not one. And so
that is the situation we are in. It troubles me.98
MR. DOMENICI: [I]f you had not helped us put this kind
of process together, we could never change the country ....
[I]f we did not have a reconciliation process, what we wanted
to change would take 30 years. 99
This exchange, and particularly Senator Byrd's remarks, consti-
tutes striking evidence of how far the 104th Congress's recon-
ciliation agenda deviated from Congress's original conception of
the process as a relatively minor mechanism for maintaining
budgetary targets.
Despite such reproaches, congressional leaders remained un-
willing to compromise. Rather than use the House-Senate con-
ference to make the bill more palatable to congressional moder-
ates and to the President, the reconciliation conferees dismantled
many of the Senate moderates' modifications. Senator Chafee's
expanded aid for the disabled was, for instance, effaced, as were
matching fund requirements inserted by other moderates.100
The conference report passed both Houses, as had the original
reconciliation bill, on a partisan vote.101 Congress had missed its
October 1st deadline by more than a month, inducing two im-
pending fiscal crises: the need to appropriate funds to keep the
government operating and the need to raise the statutory limit
on the public debt. Congress's emphasis on reconciliation, 02
98 141 CONG. REc. S16,034 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
99 141 CONG. REC. S16,035 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
100 See Collete Fraley, Scaled-Back Medicaid Savings Plan Emerges from Conference,
57 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3539 (1995); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-350, pt. 2, at 1064-65
(1995).
'
01 The final House vote, which took place three days after the Senate vote, was
235-192, with only one Republican, Christopher H. Smith of New Jersey, voting against
the bill, and five Democrats voting for it. In the Senate, the 52-47 vote was even more
partisan, with moderate William Cohen of Maine as the only Republican dissident, and
no Democrats voting for the bill. See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-59.
02 The House-Senate conference on the reconciliation bill alone took more than two
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coupled with its determination to restructure the federal govern-
ment through funding decisions, 03 pushed the thirteen annual
appropriations bills far behind schedule. More than one month
after the start of the new fiscal year, only two appropriations
bills had been signed into law.10 4 Congress had passed one tem-
porary stopgap spending measure, or CR, 105 on September 29, but
it was to expire on November 13.106 With reconciliation behind
schedule, Congress decided to use a second CR and a short-term
debt limit extension as leverage to gain concessions from the
President. It attached to the interim legislation several contro-
versial measures, including a plan to increase Medicare premiums
and several restrictive rules that would seriously limit the Treas-
ury Department's ability to stave off default if a long-term debt
limit increase were not enacted shortly thereafter.107 The President
immediately vetoed both measures, 08 precipitating the first of two
historic federal government shut-downs 19 and a series of ex-
weeks. See id. at 2-44, 2-57 (noting Senate approval of the reconciliation bill on
October 28, and the filing of the completed conference report on November 15).
103 Congress persisted in attaching numerous policy riders to ordinary appropriations
legislation. Many of the policy riders were abortion-restricting initiatives, which
provoked contentious debate. The Labor-Health and Human Services appropriations
bill, for example, contained a provision that would end the federal mandate on states
to pay for abortions for poor women in cases of rape or incest. The appropriations bill
for Veterans' Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and independent agencies was
particularly remarkable, carrying 17 riders prohibiting the enforcement of pending and
existing EPA policies, the Fair Housing Act, and other core agency policies. See Jackie
Koszczuk, Gingrich's Abortion Strategies, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3376, 3376 (1995).
104 See Andrew Taylor, GOP Rifts Delay Spending Bills, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
3356, 3356 (1995).
105 Continuing resolutions traditionally continue funding at the lowest of three levels:
current spending, the level set by the House-passed appropriations bill, or the level set
by the Senate-passed bill. See George Hager, THE BUDGET: Avoiding a Shutdown, 53
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2782, 2782 (1995).
106 See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-57.
107 Specifically, the debt limit would rise to $4.967 trillion up to December 12, and
then revert to $4.8 trillion, which was less than the existing ceiling. Further, the bill
prevented the Treasury Department from juggling federal trust fund dollars to raise
money to keep the government from defaulting on its loan obligations. See id. at 2-65.
Also included in the short-term bill were a measure overhauling habeas corpus laws,
a regulatory reform bill that had fallen to a Senate filibuster earlier that year, and a
requirement that the President agree to pass a seven-year budget-balancing plan using
Congressional Budget Office accounting methods. See id.
108 Congress passed the debt limit bill on November 10, and the CR on November
13; President Clinton vetoed both bills on November 13. See Hager, supra note 5, at
3508.
109As discussed supra note 5, the federal government had shut down nine times
before, but never for more than three days. The first 1995 shutdown, by contrast, lasted
six full days. See Hager, supra note 5, at 3503. The shutdown sent home nearly 800,000
"non-essential" federal workers and indefinitely suspended numerous federally funded
activities, from medical research to the processing of Social Security applications. See
id.
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traordinary fiscal maneuvers by the Treasury Department.'10 Con-
gressional leaders' inclusion of the Medicare proposal in the CR
provided the President, ever-conscious of the polls, with impor-
tant political ammunition with which to criticize and blame Re-
publicans."'
Five days later, Congress and the President enacted a promis-
ing CR, ending the government shutdown and extending federal
funding through the middle of December. This CR ostensibly
committed the President to work towards an agreement that would
balance the budget in seven years, using Congressional Budget
Office ("CBO") projections, while requiring Congress to accept
the President's priorities respecting, inter alia, Medicaid, educa-
tion, and the environment." 2 Negotiations between congressional
leaders and the White House quickly broke down, however, as
the two branches deadlocked over differing interpretations of the
CR, particularly concerning whether the CBO's or the Office of
Management and Budget's ("OMB") economic assumptions should
be used to estimate the budget plan's savings projections." 3 Con-
trary to Republicans' expectations," 4 the President's approval
100n November 15, 1995, for example, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin "disin-
vested" two government-retirement funds for civil service employees, converting them,
in form, from government-issued securities (debt) to non-interest-paying IOUs. On
paper, the transaction created an additional $61.3 billion in borrowing authority without
exceeding the $4.9 trillion statutory debt limit. See id. at 3508.
"' See DREW, supra note 4, at 323.
1 2Specifically, the continuing resolution provided that:
(a) The President and the Congress shall enact legislation . . . to achieve a
balanced budget not later than fiscal year 2002 as estimated by the Congres-
sional Budget Office, and the President and the Congress agree that the
balanced budget must... ensure Medicare solvency, reform welfare, and provide
adequate funding for Medicaid, education, agriculture, national defense, veterans
and the environment . . . and (b) the balanced-budget agreement shall be esti-
mated by the Congressional Budget Office... following a thorough consultation
and review with the Office of Management and Budget ....
H.R.J. Res. 122, 104th Cong. (1995).
"
3 The economic assumptions that govern GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, and
interest rate predictions used in budget projections are the central features of a budget
proposal, as even minuscule (i.e., less that one percentage point) differences in such
predictions make billions of dollars of difference when dealing with debts and expendi-
tures in the billions and trillions. In 1995, OMB's assumptions were slightly more
optimistic than CBO's, enabling the President to offer a counter proposal with fewer
entitlement cuts than the Republicans', but still claim to achieve balance in seven years.
CBO calculated that the President's plan produced $365 billion less in cuts than did
Congress's. Thus, Congress was adamant that any budget agreement it reached with
the President be scored by CBO, while the President insisted that OMB's calculations
were more accurate. See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-59.
"4Republicans believed that a shutdown would hurt Clinton more than it would
them, largely because the shutdown in 1990 had hurt President Bush. See DREW, supra
note 4, at 324.
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ratings soared throughout the shutdown, while congressional Re-
publicans' declined.11 5
Almost one month after the first government shutdown, the
President vetoed the budget reconciliation bill," 6 and offered in
its stead his own proposal to balance the budget in seven years-
based on OMB's economic assumptions and projections.1 7 Con-
gressional Republicans denounced the plan as "an insult" and
stormed out of the recently resumed negotiations. "8 The President
proposed a new plan on December 15, the day the first CR was
scheduled to expire, but Congress quickly rejected it.119 With no
CR and six of the annual appropriations bills still to be enacted,
a significant portion of the federal government shut down once
more on December 16.120 After several additional weeks of ne-
gotiations and little headway, the two branches ultimately aban-
doned the balanced-budget goal and passed an omnibus appro-
priations bill covering the remainder of fiscal 1996 instead.1 21
III. REDEFINING RECONCILIATION:
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESS'S
POWER OF THE PURSE
Despite its enormous power as a budget integration and deficit
reduction tool, the reconciliation process does not give Congress
unfettered control over the federal budget or the budget process.
Nor does it render Congress commensurate with the President
in his capacity to impel comprehensive national reform. As Sec-
tion A explains, the fiscal constitution contemplates a significant
role for the President in the budget process; although reconcili-
"
5 For a more detailed discussion about public perceptions and poll ratings, see
MA tNIss & WEISSKOPF, supra note 1, at 146-49, 152-53; and DREW, supra note 4,
at 324-26.
"16 The President's veto, delivered on December 6, 1995, criticized congressional
Republicans for taking an "extreme" approach that would "hurt average Americans and
help special interests." 'Profound Differences' Cited in Veto of Budget Plan, 51 CONG.
Q. ALMANAC D-37, D-37 to D-38 (1996) (full text of the President's message to
Congress vetoing the reconciliation bill).117 See id.
1187or a colorful journalistic account of Republicans' reactions to the plan, see
MARANISS & WEISSKOPF, supra note 1, at 159-65.
"
9 See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-62.
120The second shutdown lasted 21 days and furloughed some 260,000 federal
employees from work. See MARANISS & WEIssKoPF, supra note 1, at 161; No Winners,
supra note 67, at 2-62.
12 1 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-34, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1321.
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ation gives Congress considerable power to shape the budget's
ultimate form, it cannot circumvent the President's priorities in
the process.
Section B demonstrates how the legal rules governing the
reconciliation process make it an ill-suited vehicle for imple-
menting sweeping legislative agendas. First, because reconcili-
ation is scheduled late in the budget process and does not cover
annual appropriations, congressional attempts at reconciliation
push the entire budget process behind schedule and (almost)
always lead to stopgap spending measures or government shut-
downs. Second, the Byrd Rule operates as a check on the extent
of reform Congress can achieve through the budget reconcili-
ation process. Third, the special rules and limited debate time
allotted to reconciliation legislation raise serious questions about
the desirability of implementing far-reaching governmental re-
form through this process.
Section C examines the politics of reconciliation and con-
cludes that, at least during divided government, there is an in-
herent tension between the partisan politics necessary to propel
a reconciliation bill through Congress and the considerable com-
promise required to induce the President to sign it.
A. The Separation of Powers and the Presidential Role in the
Constitutional Budget Process
The modem fiscal constitution is built on a blueprint that
envisions the President as the central figure in the budget proc-
ess. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 ("1921 Act"), 2 2 for
instance, makes the President responsible for initiating the budget
process by requiring him to submit a budget proposal to Con-
gress at the start of each year.23 This procedural feature empow-
ers the President to frame the budget discourse, and casts Con-
gress in the role of respondent to his agenda. Further, the 1921
Act gives the President significant power in budget formulation
and deliberation by establishing the executive Bureau of the
Budget (now OMB) to assist him with budget calculations. 2 4 As
122Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31
U.S.C.).
123See id. § 201, 42 Stat. at 20-21 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1994)).
124See id. § 207, 42 Stat. at 22 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31
U.S.C.).
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a result, the President is well-equipped to translate his political
agenda into budget proposals.
Recent innovations in the budget process have adapted to,
rather than altered, this basic framework. Although the Congres-
sional Budget Act of 1974 centralizes the legislative budget process
and increases Congress's control over the budget as a unit,125 it
does so within the structure established by the 1921 Act. 126 The
congressional budget resolution is basically an integrated re-
sponse to the President's budget proposal, and CBO merely a
legislative version of OMB. Moreover, Congress must still await
the President's proposal before it begins work on its own reso-
lution. Finally, even if Congress decides to reject some or all of
the President's proposal, it must keep in mind his priorities in
order to produce a budget he will sign. Thus, presidential pri-
orities remain of paramount importance in the constitutional
budget process.
Reconciliation does not change this fundamental feature of the
fiscal constitution. Notably, reconciliation is not a necessary com-
ponent of the annual budget process, which requires only the
passage of the thirteen annual appropriations bills responsible
for funding the federal government. Further, reconciliation rules-
such as time limits on debate and prohibitions on non-germane
amendments-which operate against traditional political inertia
to expedite reconciliation in Congress, do not affect the Presi-
dent. Absent a reconciliation bill, the government's tax and en-
titlement policies automatically continue in their current vein;
thus, a President who prefers the status quo to proposed recon-
ciliation legislation faces no legal or institutional obligation to
sign such a bill into law. 27 Recent history illustrates the impact
of this institutional limitation: throughout much of the 1980s
Presidents Reagan and Bush effectively hampered congressional
reconciliation efforts with pledges to veto any legislation pro-
posing a tax increase. 28
125 See supra Part I.A.
126 Cf Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 189 (3d ed. 1993) (maintain-
ing that the congressional budget process created by the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 was modeled on the executive budget established by the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921).
127See Tiefer, supra note 3, at 439.
128See History, supra note 35, at 2714-15; Tiefer, supra note 3, at 439. President
Bush eventually backed off on his tax stance in order to avoid GRH cuts. See supra
Part I.C.
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Because the reconciliation process leaves Congress with no
procedural leverage to force the President's cooperation in its
budget reform efforts, Congress must either compromise part of
its agenda or resort to strategic manipulations-such as tying
reconciliation legislation to some required component of the
budget process-in order to induce the President to sign it. The
1995-96 government shutdowns were the direct result of the
latter tactic: faced with a President who preferred the status quo
to its reform agenda, Congress tried to coerce the Executive's
cooperation by refusing to pass a CR or a debt limit extension
unless he agreed to some of its most controversial proposals. 2 9
This tactic, of course, ultimately failed-suggesting that com-
promise may be the only way for Congress to gain the Presi-
dent's cooperation in passing reconciliation legislation.
Indeed, as Part I discusses, GRH was the only budget innovation
that somewhat successfully operated against this institutional limi-
tation by giving the President an incentive (the fear of sequestra-
tion) to cooperate with Congress in passing deficit-reducing recon-
ciliation legislation.130 In 1987, for instance, an historic stock
market crash in the face of impending GRH cuts brought Presi-
dent Reagan to the table to negotiate a bipartisan budget recon-
ciliation deal. 3' Similarly, in 1990, the fear of sequestration
under GRH drove President Bush to break the congressional-
presidential impasse and accept a reconciliation package that
violated his "no new taxes" pledge. 3 2 Even GRH, however, could
not ultimately force the nation's leaders to produce reconcili-
ation legislation that would balance the budget, let alone within
a given number of years.
In fact, most Congress-initiated attempts to reorient the budget
via reconciliation have failed. 33 Those that have succeeded typi-
129 House majority whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) explained congressional Republicans'
strategy as follows: "If [the President] shuts the government down we'll keep it shut
down until he signs a bill or an agreement in writing about what he will do." DREW,
supra note 4, at 322.
130 See supra Part I.B.2.
131See History, supra note 35, at 2714-15; see also GILMOUR, supra note 20, at
217-20.
132 See History, supra note 35, at 2714-15; GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 217-20. See
also Budget Adopted After Long Battle, 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 111, 111-12 (1990).
133 Congress attempted to initiate sizable reconciliation packages in 1980, 1982, 1983,
1985, 1987, and 1995; all but the second attempt ultimately collapsed due to inter-con-
gressional or congressional-presidential deadlock. Rising inflation in 1980 did prompt
congressional-presidential budget meetings and reconciliation legislation, but this was
wholly independent of the Senate's original attempts to initiate reconciliation (which
failed due to disagreement with the House). Similarly, the GRH-inspired stock market
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cally have occurred during unified (or functionally unified)3 4
government, with party leaders putting pressure on the Presi-
dent, 35 or have been driven by the threat of dire economic con-
sequences, such as those imposed by GRH. In either case, con-
gressionally driven reconciliation bills have been passed only as
a result of special meetings, external to the traditional budget
process, between Congress and the President. 36
B. The Legal Limitations on Reconciliation as a Vehicle for
Legislative Reform
Reconciliation was designed to play an integrative, harmoniz-
ing role in the budget process, not to serve as its impetus.
Despite the expansion of its role over the past twenty years, the
process is not procedurally equipped to implement national con-
gressional agendas. Specifically, when Congress tries to use rec-
onciliation to this end, it runs into three legal limitations: timing,
the Byrd Rule, and the twenty-hour cap on debate.
1. Timing and the Appropriations Dilemma
The timing of the budget process is not conducive to the use
of the reconciliation process to achieve substantial legislative
change. As Part I explains, reconciliation originally took place
on the heels of the second budget resolution, within the ten-day
window between September 15 and September 25.137 Since Con-
gress informally amended this rule to allow reconciliation in-
structions in the first budget resolution, 138 reconciliation has be-
crash in 1987 prodded an economic summit between Congressional and presidential
budget-makers, which in turn produced a reconciliation bill, but this second effort at
reconciliation (and its results) differed significantly from Congress's original plan. See
History, supra note 35, at 2714-15.
134By "functionally unified" I mean where one party has a working majority on
budget issues, even though it may not control both houses (e.g., 1981, when the Senate
and President were both GOP-controlled, and the House had a conservative majority
on budget matters). See discussion supra note 39 on "boll weevil" Democrats in the
House.
135Both the 1982 and 1984 attempts occurred while the Senate was controlled by the
President's party. This enabled Senate leaders to rely on party politics and special Rose
Garden meetings to gain the President's cooperation. See GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 116.
136 The 1982, 1987, and 1990 reconciliation bills were all passed after congressional-
presidential budget summits. See GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 123; History, supra note
35, at 2714-15.
137 See supra note 13; GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 108.
138 See supra Part I.A.
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gun immediately after the passage of the first resolution, and
committees have been scheduled to report reconciliation bills by
mid-June.1 39 While this innovation gives Congress more time to
craft and consider reconciliation measures, it is still insufficient.
With the notable exception of 1984, when Congress reversed its
traditional budget process and approved deficit reduction legis-
lation before passing a budget resolution, 140 reconciliation bills
have passed Congress long past schedule.1 41 As a result, their
capacity to realize savings has been greatly reduced. 42
Further, congressional attempts at reconciliation interfere with
other aspects of the budget process. Notably, both annual appro-
priations and reconciliation bills are scheduled to be reported out
of committee in June. 143 Thus, when Congress attempts recon-
ciliation, it must work on both types of legislation simultane-
ously. Although different committees are responsible for drafting
reconciliation and appropriations legislation, both processes tend
to consume the attention of the legislature, and the majority
party leadership. Reconciliation thus draws Congress's focus away
from the annual appropriations process, precipitating delays in
the passage of funding necessary to keep the federal government
running. Indeed, not once in the twelve times that Congress has
attempted reconciliation has it managed to complete all, or even
most, of the thirteen annual appropriations bills on time. t44 Such
repeated breakdowns in the budget process have necessitated the
passage of numerous CRs over the past several years. 145 The use
of CRs peaked during the 1980s, when Congress often gave up
on passing annual appropriations and allowed the stopgap spend-
139See GILMOUR, supra note 20, at 111; Christopher Cox, Capitol Offenders: A
Budget Reform to Stop Congress from Breaking the Law, POL'Y Rnv., Fall 1990, at 41.
14OSee History, supra note 35, at 2714.
141In the years preceding 1995 when Congress passed reconciliation bills, delays
occurred five times: 1980 (Dec. 3); 1986 (Oct. 17); 1987 (Dec. 22); 1989 (Nov. 22);
and 1990 (Oct. 27). See id. at 2714-15.
142This is because by the time a reconciliation bill's savings provisions take effect,
a considerable portion of the fiscal year has already elapsed. See GILMOUR, supra note
20, at 112.
143The annual appropriations bills are due from committees by June 30, and recon-
ciliation legislation is due June 15. See Cox, supra note 139, at 41.
144See History, supra note 35, at 2714-15 (summarizing congressional attempts at
reconciliation in each of the eight years from 1980-87, as well as 1989, 1990, and
1993).
145See Jackie Calmes, Congress Misses Oct. 1 Deadline; Short-Term Measure Fills
Gap, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2538, 2538 (1989) (noting the passage of a CR in 1989);
Another CR, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3477, 3477 (1990) (discussing the passage of a
third CR in 1990); Status of Appropriations, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3345, 3345
(1993) (reporting Congress's passage of a CR in 1993).
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ing measures to supply federal funding for the entire year.146
Significantly, Congress attempted reconciliation in every one of
those years, with the exception of 1988;147 in the few recent years
when Congress has not attempted reconciliation, as in 1988 and
1994, appropriations have been completed on time and without
any CRs. 148
In general, the larger and more ambitious a reconciliation bill,
the longer it will take Congress to complete, 149 and the more it
will interfere with the appropriations process. Thus, when Con-
gress seeks to achieve massive reforms through the reconcili-
ation process, as it did in 1995-96, the entire budget process can
suffer.
2. The Byrd Rule Revisited
Reconciliation's aptness as a tool for enacting a comprehen-
sive agenda of legislative reform is further limited by the pro-
cedural restrictions of the Byrd Rule. As Part I describes, the
Byrd Rule operates as a check on congressional efforts to use
reconciliation to implement sweeping legislative agendas that
are only indirectly related to budget concerns (e.g., restrictions
on abortion and assisted suicide). While the Byrd Rule techni-
cally may be waived by a three-fifths Senate majority,150 this has
never occurred in practice.
Recent reconciliation efforts illustrate the power that the Byrd
Rule has to restrict the scope of reconciliation's accomplish-
ments. In 1993, for instance, the Byrd Rule forced Congress to
drop several significant reforms from President Clinton's sweep-
ing reconciliation bill,5 including a review mechanism to limit
146See Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year
1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 392 n.19. (1988).
147 See History, supra note 35, at 2714.
148See id. (no reconciliation legislation attempted in 1988 or 1994); Jackie Calmes,
Hopes Grow Dim for Meeting Fiscal 1990 Deadline, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2441, 2442
(1989) (observing that 1988 was the first time since 1954 that no CR had been passed).
149 Several members of Congress have argued in favor of restrictive House rules limiting
the scope of the reconciliation bill for just this reason. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 49,
at 28 (prepared statement of Trent Lott, (R-Miss.)) ("[Tihe inclusion of such [unre-
lated] matters only complicates, confuses and delays efforts by the two Houses and the
White House to hammer-out a final reconciliation bill.") (emphasis added).
150 See supra Part I.B.1.
151 While the reforms were not literally forced out of the reconciliation bill by the
Byrd Rule, conferees removed them in advance in response to Byrd Rule threats from
the minority party. See Deficit-Reduction Bill Narrowly Passes, 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC
107, 119 (1993).
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entitlement spending as well as several provisions that would
have raised the threshold for paying Social Security taxes on
domestic employees. 152 Similarly, in 1995, congressional Demo-
crats used the Byrd Rule to gut several ideological provisions
central to Republicans' "Contract With America" agenda; elimi-
nated were measures ending welfare and Medicaid as entitle-
ments, providing a bonus for states that reduced the number of
out-of-wedlock births, and giving states the option to deny higher
welfare checks to recipients who continue to have children. 153
Most of these provisions, while consistent with the Republicans'
campaign platform, would have had little or no effect on aggre-
gate entitlement expenditures.
The institution of the Byrd Rule stemmed from congressional
concern over the use of the reconciliation bill as a substitute for
the traditional legislative process.154 What Congress may not have
realized, however, is that in emphasizing budget resolution tar-
gets and the relationship between revenues and outlays, it was
not only restricting committee chairmen's ability to sneak pet
projects onto reconciliation legislation; it was also significantly
constraining its own ability to use reconciliation to effect sweep-
ing legislative reform.
3. Restrictive Rules and the Quality of Deliberation
Finally, restrictive rules and time limits capping debate on
reconciliation legislation make it extraordinarily difficult for mem-
bers of Congress to know or understand the effect that individual
components of the bill will ultimately have. Indeed, the rules
and debate time allotted for consideration of reconciliation leg-
islation seem inversely proportional to the magnitude and con-
sequence of the policy changes such legislation entails. While
this facet of reconciliation is often embraced by those who wish
to railroad sweeping changes past an unprepared legislature, it
ultimately constrains even majority leaders' ability to discern
how to achieve the reforms they desire, or evaluate the impact
of the policies they eventually choose.
152 See id.
153 See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-57.
154See, e.g., TIEFER, supra note 19, at 893 n.121 (discussing Senator Byrd's com-
plaints that a particular rider to a reconciliation bill had not received consideration in
the relevant committee).
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The passage of the fiscal 1996 budget reconciliation bill is in-
structive. Few, if any, members of Congress could have read the
bill's nearly 2000 page text before voting on it, yet no hearings
were held on the impact or merits of the bill.155 Even majority party
leaders had trouble understanding and explaining the projected im-
pact of specific portions of the bill and of proposed amendments. 5 6
One episode illustrates particularly well the level of confusion
surrounding the passage of the bill. Senator Christopher Bond
(R-Mo.) had proposed to increase the tax deduction for health-
insurance premiums paid by self-employed workers from thirty
percent to fifty-five percent. 157 Another senator asked how Bond
proposed to pay for the amendment, which was expected to cost
more than $3.8 billion over seven years.15 Senator Bond looked to
majority leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.), who had been bargaining off
the floor with lobbyists. The majority leader ambiguously responded
that "we found another area where they overestimated or underesti-
mated, or whatever it is1'159 Based on this information, the Senate
proceeded to vote for the amendment, 99-0.160
Over the years, many members of Congress have echoed
Senator Byrd's concerns 161 about implementing far-reaching na-
tional reforms in this manner. For instance, Leon Panetta (D-
Cal.), former House Budget Committee chairman and White
House Chief of Staff during the 1995-96 budget battle, once
remarked that:
The legislative product of the Congress is best when it has
received proper scrutiny in both Houses. Because reconcili-
ation bills involve hundreds of provisions, we do not always
have a proper debate on each and every item in the bill. If
reconciliation is limited to spending cuts and tax increases
alone, this is less of a problem. But when reconciliation includes
complicated reauthorizations and extensive policy changes, we
155 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
156Similar problems plagued the omnibus continuing resolutions of the 1980s. See
generally Devins, supra note 146, at 396-400 (relating not only that the 1988 CR was
passed on extraordinarily limited legislative debate and amendment and without the
benefit of review by committees with appropriate expertise, but also that members did
not have an opportunity to read the more than 2100-page amended bill). While such
resolutions certainly present difficulties, the problem is only magnified by reconcili-
ation bills, such as that passed in 1995, which seek to effect wholesale reformation of
the nation's fiscal landscape.
157 See No Winners, supra note 67, at 2-51 (citing Senate vote 515).
15S See id.
159 Id160 See id.
161 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Harvard Journal on Legislation
run the risk of enacting laws which have not faced the give
and take of the traditional legislative process. 162
In other words, the more Congress tries to accomplish through
reconciliation, the less it thinks through what it is doing, and the
less accurate its predictions about the impact of proposed re-
forms are likely to be.163 Given the far-reaching national sig-
nificance of the reforms at stake, the expedited reconciliation
process thus seems an injudicious and "undemocratic"'' 64 vehicle
through which to institute sweeping legislative agendas.
C. The Politics of Reconciliation
Federal spending is difficult to control in large part because it
stems from established political programs and funding obliga-
tions made in prior years. It is politically much easier for Con-
gress to continue funding programs at existing levels than to
redesign or eliminate long-standing policies with entrenched con-
stituencies. Reconciliation requires Congress to overcome this
inherent political inertia and make unpopular policy changes.
Moreover, in a nod to congressional committees, it delegates the
task of implementing these changes to those with the most in-
terest in preserving the status quo.
Despite these political complexities, the process has survived
because it facilitates centralized majority-party control. Mem-
bers of the congressional majority are loathe to let down their
party on one of its most crucial initiatives of the year.165 In
addition, restrictive rules on the House and Senate floor operate
against the political inertia that would otherwise impede the
passage of reconciliation legislation. 66
162Hearings, supra note 49, at 12 (statement of Leon Panetta).
163 For instance, the 1981 reconciliation package, which sped through Congress on
the strength of restrictive rules and limited time for debate, generated a string of
colossal deficits that doubled the national debt within five years. See FISHER, supra
note 126, at 191. In retrospect, David Stockman, the OMB director who had pushed
for the 1981 agenda, admitted that "a plan for radical and abrupt changes required deep
comprehension-and we had none of it" DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF
POLITICS 91 (1986).
164 Cf. Devins, supra note 145, at 399 (labeling the 1987 omnibus continuing resolution
"undemocratic" for similar reasons).
165 See David S. Cloud, GOP Moderates Refusing to Get in Line, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 2963, 2963 (1995) (noting that GOP moderates "have a definite political stake in
seeing their party succeed in its quest to pass a balanced-budget plan ...").
166For instance, time limits on the debate accompanying reconciliation legislation
prevent senators from using filibuster tactics to delay key votes on reconciliation.
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Paradoxically, however, the same features that facilitate the pas-
sage of reconciliation in Congress jeopardize its chances for ulti-
mate enactment under divided government. As the history of rec-
onciliation demonstrates, in order to achieve reconciliation during
divided government, Congress must invite minority party and presi-
dential input almost from the outset.167 Budget summits, not
closed-door intra-party sessions, must take place prior to or during
the preparation of reconciliation legislation in order for Congress
to produce a reconciliation bill that the President will sign.161
Positive political theory provides a useful tool for understanding
the political paradox inherent in the reconciliation process. Ac-
cording to a political science theory known as the median voter
model, legislative policymaking is inherently incremental and
hostile to radical or sweeping changes. 169 Specifically, the model
proffers that legislative preferences, rather than party-line vot-
ing, determine policy outcomes. Thus, if legislative preferences
are ranked from 1 to 100 (or 1 to 435) on a conservative-liberal
continuum, only those policy initiatives that reflect the prefer-
ences of a majority1 70 of either house will pass successfully.17'
Further, the model predicts that successful policy initiatives
must cater disproportionately to the preferences of median vot-
ers-i.e., moderate legislators whose preferences fall in the mid-
dle of the continuum-because these legislators' votes are cru-
cial to achieving the requisite majority.72 Moreover, under
divided government, the model holds that successful policy in-
itiatives must reflect a broader range of preferences, so as to
attract enough votes to overcome a presidential veto. 73 Ulti-
mately, this need to temper proposals to suit the preferences of
median voters is hypothesized to keep legislative policies from
167See supra Part III.A.
168See, e.g., supra note 136.
169See, e.g., DAVID W. BRADY & CRAIG VOLDEN, REVOLVING GRIDLOCK: POLITICS
AND POLICY FROM CARTER TO CLINTON 2-3 (1998).
170 In the case of the Senate, policies must actually reflect the preferences of at least
60 members in order to avoid becoming casualties of the filibuster. See id. at 16-17.
17 1 See id. at 7.
172 See id. See also Mathew McCubbins et al., Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 19 (1994).
173 See BRADY & VOLDEN, supra note 169, at 15-16. Specifically, Professors Brady
and Volden maintain that policy made during divided government must comport with
the preferences of the 40th through the 66th Senators (and presumably the 174th
through the 287th or 288th Representatives), while policy enacted during unified
government need only reflect the preferences of the 34th to the 60th Senator (and
presumably the 147th or 148th to the 261st Representatives). See id.
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swinging from one end of the continuum to the other within
relatively short periods of time.
As Part I describes, however, budget reconciliation does not
cater to the median voter. Rather than inspire moderate legisla-
tion that reflects the preferences of median congressional vot-
ers-and is thus capable of overriding a presidential veto-rec-
onciliation often reflects the preferences of the majority party
leadership and can produce radical, uncompromising proposals
which boast the support of only the barest congressional majori-
ties. In 1995, for instance, the special rules and procedures gov-
erning the reconciliation process enabled the party leadership to
attempt sweeping welfare and Medicare reforms that ignored the
preferences of moderate legislators. Notably, while Senate mod-
erates managed to temper several of the leadership's more con-
troversial proposals, reconciliation conferees used their power to
eradicate most of the moderates' palliative amendments from the
bill's final version. 74 In so doing, they eliminated those provi-
sions that might have made the reconciliation bill tolerable to
President Clinton,75 thereby effectively guaranteeing a presiden-
tial veto with little chance of an override.
There is, then, an inherent tension, during divided government,
between the legislative centralization and partisan politics re-
quired to pass reconciliation legislation through both Houses of
Congress, and the considerable concession and moderation nec-
essary to get it past the President's desk. While this tension has
been overcome a few times during the past decade, it has led
more often to budget breakdowns and shutdowns.
D. Conclusion: Reconciliation and the Balanced Budget
Amendment 176
For years, revenues and entitlements remained outside the
reach of Congress's annual budget calculus. Reconciliation cre-
ated a mechanism for integrating these crucial fiscal elements
with the rest of the budget process, and thus appeared to increase
Congress's aggregate control over the nation's purse strings.
174 See Tiefer, supra note 3, at 440.
175 See id.
176 Although the most recent version of the balanced budget amendment failed to pass
Congress in February 1997, see S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. (1997), discussions of its
probable effect remain worthwhile because the amendment continues to enjoy a good
deal of support and is likely to resurface.
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However, congressional efforts at reconciliation over the past
decade and a half evince lingering constraints on Congress's
efficient exercise of its power of the purse. In particular, this
Note has argued that the isolation of revenues and entitlements
from the annual appropriations process limits Congress's control
over the budget and engenders several conflicts. Missed deadlines,
omnibus CRs, and the inevitable threat of government shutdown
are only the most apparent casualties caused by this procedural
constraint. More fundamentally, the automatic year-to-year con-
tinuation of revenue and entitlement legislation, and the atten-
dant optional nature of reconciliation, constitute powerful obsta-
cles in the way of congressional efforts to control the budget.
Indeed, recent congressional attempts at reconciliation illustrate
what some commentators have recognized for some time: consti-
tutional provisions notwithstanding, the power of the purse does
not belong exclusively to Congress, but is shared with the Execu-
tive.177 Despite the constitutional requisite of legislative approval
for the appropriation of federal funds, it is difficult for Congress
to restrain federal spending without the President's cooperation.
As evinced by the 104th Congress's efforts to cut Medicare,
Congress is powerless to reduce automatic entitlement "appro-
priations" absent presidential approval. Moreover, as reconcili-
ation efforts during the Reagan and Bush Administrations illus-
trate, Congress's power to initiate taxation is relatively meaningless
when countered with a presidential veto (or threat thereof). 78
In light of these constraints, congressional proposals that seek
to compel deficit reduction-most notably the Balanced Budget
Amendment-appear misguided and, if enacted, are likely to
have little practical effect on budget outcomes. Like GRH, an
amendment mandating budgetary balance would alter the Presi-
dent's political incentives to join congressional efforts at passing
reconciliation legislation. However, inducing Congress and the
President to attempt reconciliation is not sufficient; as reconcili-
ation efforts under GRH demonstrated, the process is not a
panacea and cannot force the political concessions necessary to
produce a balanced budget.
177This is true even independent of the President's new line-item veto authority,
which of course shifts considerable additional budgetary power to the Executive.
178 Congress, of course, retains the power to override the President's veto, but again,
experience during the Reagan and Bush years demonstrates that the two-thirds majority
required for an override is extremely difficult to obtain. In addition, it remains to be
seen what effect the new three-fifths rule will have on Congress's power of taxation.
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On the contrary, as illustrated in Sections A to C, the recon-
ciliation process is fraught with inherent tensions, many of which
a balanced budget amendment would exacerbate. For instance,
an amendment requiring that the federal budget balance outlays
against receipts would escalate the importance of economic as-
sumptions and projections, thereby magnifying the likelihood of
estimation conflicts between CBO and OMB-such as the one
that stalled the 1995-96 budget negotiations. Further, in making
a balanced budget "must-pass" legislation, such an amendment
might increase the incidence of individual attempts-such as
Newt Gingrich's in the infamous Air Force One incident' 79-to
hold the budget hostage to personal concerns or political de-
mands on other matters. 180 In addition, a requirement that Con-
gress pass a balanced budget would reduce the amount of funds
available for federal programs, thereby intensifying legislative
conflict over favorite projects and prolonging the formulation of
both reconciliation and appropriations legislation. Accordingly,
legislators would almost certainly miss the annual appropriations
deadline, creating the need to enact a CR. As the 1995-96 budget
battle demonstrated, passing such a continuing resolution would
likely entail its own set of complications. Thus, in all but the
most conciliatory of political climates-a phenomenon that has
eluded Washington since World War II-the conflation of the
reconciliation process and a balanced budget amendment seems
destined to provoke congressional-presidential conflict, and con-
sequently, produce another government shutdown.
This Note has argued that reconciliation's fortification of the
congressional budget process is not as absolute as Congress
seems to think. Indeed, far from facilitating congressional budget-
making, or consummating Congress's power of the purse, the rec-
onciliation process suffers from political and procedural tensions
of its own. The challenge before Congress is to recognize these
tensions and work to limit, rather than intensify, their impact.
179 See MARANISS & WEISSKOPF, supra note 1, at 152.
180 Cf The Balanced Budget Amendment: Hearings on H.R.J. Res. I Before the House
Comm. on the Budget, 105th Cong. 244 (1997) (statement of Allen Schick, Professor
of Public Policy, University of Maryland) (noting that a balanced budget amendment
proposal requiring a three-fifths supermajority for various budgetary measures would
mean that even if a majority agrees on budget policy, "the minority will be able to
extort concessions from the majority before it agrees to vote for the budget").
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